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Similar to the first section, these passages insist that the “foreign presence” in Yemen’s ports must end. It also asks that port inspections be conducted in Hodeida (where Houthi forces have continued their tense standoff with the government for months) as opposed to, say, Jeddah (where the Saudis could exercise more oversight). Similarly, the document calls for the demilitarization of border crossings, which-like the airport-could allow the Houthis to receive illicit transfers more easily. The UN has attempted to negotiate a middle way that allows for reopening the airport while recognizing the coalition’s concerns, but the Houthi vision shows no sign of those discussions. The coalition has long opposed allowing such flights for fear that Tehran will use them as an air bridge to send weapons and other assistance to the Houthis. For example, it calls for reopening the airport in Houthi-controlled Sana to “direct” flights. The UN has tried to negotiate some of them into previous confidence-building measures, but the new document does not give any indication of potential compromise. Many longstanding Houthi “asks” are repeated here. The vision’s second section is the heart of the Houthi wish list: ending the coalition’s air, land, and sea blockades on Yemen.
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According to the document, various joint commands will oversee the ceasefire in cooperation with the UN, whose coordinating role is stated in very explicit terms-probably owing to the Houthi view that the Saudis cannot be a combatant and mediator at the same time. The Houthis could conceivably apply this formulation to Saudi Arabia, while Riyadh could use it against Iran. In addition, the section repeatedly refers to ending all foreign interference in Yemen. It also calls for establishing “brotherly relations,” ending all negative media statements, and avoiding any activities that might undermine the ceasefire-a worrisome catchall that could be interpreted differently by the parties later. It calls for an immediate ceasefire, to include stopping the movement of forces and weapons and ending all attacks on Yemeni and Saudi soil. In the first section, the language is fairly predictable. The document has three headliner sections: (1) ending the war and implementing a ceasefire, (2) ending the coalition blockade and alleviating the humanitarian situation, and (3) reaching a political settlement.
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It reads not as a negotiated agreement with concessions from both sides, but as a Houthi wish list. The text lays out the conditions under which the Houthis would accept a ceasefire, and thus may provide some insight into why they have not yet offered to join the latest one.Įxcept for participating in ceasefires and retrieving landmines, the eight-page document puts the entire burden of ending the war and righting Yemen’s economic ship onto the Saudi-led coalition.
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As the media focuses on the Saudi ceasefire, it is equally important to put a critical eye on this Houthi political document. Just hours before Saudi Arabia announced that it was implementing a two-week, extendable ceasefire in Yemen on April 8, the Houthis released their own “vision” for ending the war. Reflecting just how emboldened the Houthis have become, their latest ceasefire document advocates maximalist positions on core issues while demanding that other actors foot the bill for reconstruction, reparations, economic recovery, and virus containment.